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Abstract
Central banks in charge of banking regulation are less aggressive in their inflation man-
date since tight monetary policy conditions could have an adverse effect on the stability of
the banking system. Due to the conflict between the two mandates, it has been argued
that banking supervisory powers should be assigned to an independent authority to avoid
inflation bias and enhance social welfare. The first part of the paper develops a theoretical
model to examine the interaction between the credit and bank’s balance sheet policy trans-
mission channels in influencing macroeconomic outcomes. When mandates are combined
to a single authority, price and financial stabilisation objectives can be complementary or
conflicting, depending on the policy instruments and types of macroeconomic shocks, with
an important impact on social welfare. The second part of the paper empirically assesses
whether central banks’ combined mandates leads to an inflation bias problem using panel
data for 25 industrialised countries from 1975 to 2007. The estimation results show that,
once we control for relevant policy and institutional factors (such as the presence of infla-
tion targeting and deposit insurance schemes), the separation of banking supervision and
monetary policy does not have a significant effect on inflation outcomes.
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1. Introduction
It is now well documented that many macroeconomic variables in several economies have gone
through the so-called “Great Moderation” period, which broadly corresponded to lower levels and volat-
ility of inflations rates, coupled with stable growth and low unemployment. Until recently, financial
regulation did not feature prominently as a macroeconomic policy tool, but, nevertheless, recent decades
have seen substantial changes in the institutional architecture of monetary policy and banking regulation
across many countries. It seems, therefore, relevant to assess how these changes have contributed to
macroeconomic outcomes and, in particular, inflation.
Historically, the institutional arrangements concerning the monetary policy and banking regulation
were mainly influenced by two distinct traditions; the Anglo-Saxon influence, where monetary policy
and banking supervision are combined under the central bank, and a German-influenced approach, where
these functions are separated.1 According to Haubrich (1996), the origin of these different traditions
is related to the evolution of the payment system. Countries that adopted the Anglo-Saxon tradition
experienced a rapid expansion of credit through the introduction of alternative forms of money, where
the central banks naturally became the guarantors of the smooth functioning of the payment system
and the regulators in these market-based financial systems. In contrast, countries that experienced a
slow expansion of credit developed a bank-based financial system of well-capitalised banks that were
regulated by an independent authority following the German tradition.
However, in the late nineties there was a tendency for the separation of these functions following
the German-style framework.2 Indeed, over the period from 1986 to 2006 for a sample of 91 countries,
Masciandaro (2009) demonstrates that 94% chose to reform their financial supervisory architecture and
unify the financial system regulators within the same agency, but different from the central bank. In par-
ticular, it is shown that the degree of unification of financial regulators is inversely related to the central
bank’s role in banking regulation and supervision. More recently, the 2008 financial crisis questioned
this apparent consensus towards the separation of functions, and several countries, including the United
Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland, but also the euro area, implemented reforms towards the reinforcement
of the role of the central bank in banking supervision (Pellegrina et al. 2010).
Notwithstanding the financial supervisory architecture trends around the world, there are strong
arguments for and against separation of banking supervision from the central bank in the academic
literature. On one hand, a combined institutional mandate, in which the central bank is also in charge of
banking supervision, provides gains in terms of information, in the sense that the central bank has access
to confidential information regarding banks’ financial situation.3 This type of information is useful in
situations in which the lender-of-last-resort support is deployed, since the decision to use this mechanism
to support banks in financial distress should be based on accurate information regarding the solvency of
these institutions.4
On the other hand, it is argued that a combined institutional mandate may lead to conflicts in the
objectives of monetary policy and banking supervision, in certain economic circumstances.5 This ar-
gument in favour of the separation of policy regimes states that a central bank responsible for banking
1For example, countries with an Anglo-Saxon influence include the United States, United Kingdom, Australia
and Hong Kong, whereas countries with German influence include Austria, Germany, Denmark, and Switzerland.
2Most notably, in 1999 the European Central Bank was assigned the responsibility for the conduct of monetary
policy in the Euro area and the national authorities became in charge of the banking regulation and supervision.
Likewise, United Kingdom and Australia have opted for the separation of these functions.
3There are other arguments in favour of combined institutional mandates, such as the access to expertise and
qualified staff argument (Garicano and Lastra 2010) and the independence argument (Tuya and Zamalloa 1994).
4Supervisory data is also relevant as a source of information regarding economic conditions and, therefore, it
can also be used to improve the accuracy of economic forecasting, which is commonly one of the core functions
of central banks.
5Another argument against the combination of monetary policy and banking regulation refers to the reputation
risk that is associated to this type of institutional arrangement. It is argued that public perception of central bank
credibility may likely be affected by its performance as a banking supervisor, mainly if a bank failure occurs.
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regulation will be more flexible in its inflation mandate if it fears that tight monetary conditions may
cause bank distress due to adverse effects of high interest rates on the profitability and soundness of the
banking sector (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1993, 1995).
The aim of this paper is, thereby, to examine, both theoretically and empirically, the implications of
different designs of monetary and financial supervisory architecture on the inflation rate dynamics. The
first part of the paper develops a theoretical model to examine the interaction between different policy
transmission channels, namely the credit channel that directly affects macroeconomic variables and the
banks’ balance sheet channel which indirectly affects macroeconomic variables through its effect on the
price of various components of aggregate demand. Focusing on the case of combined mandates, cases
where the price and financial stabilisation objectives are complementary or conflicting are identified,
highlighting the role of policy instruments and types of macroeconomic shocks on welfare.
The second part empirically investigates if monetary policy and banking regulation have conflicting
goals by assessing whether institutional mandates in which the central bank plays a banking supervis-
ory role have, on average, led to higher inflation rates in relation to a separate regime. In addition, we
consider the impact on inflation from other components of the monetary and financial supervisory ar-
chitecture, namely the degree of independence of central banks, whether they were assigned an explicit
inflation targeting mandate, or whether the establishment of deposit insurance systems with the view to
enhancing financial stability by protecting deposits may influence the monetary policy stance.
Building upon the work by DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and Copelovitch and Singer (2008), we
address several limitations in their models and extend the analysis in several ways. As Copelovitch and
Singer (2008) point out, some of their results should be interpreted carefully due to the small size of
the sample they are using, which is a panel data that comprises 23 industrialised countries ranging from
1975 to 1999. Since they opt for transforming the annual data into five-year averages, the sample size
is even more reduced. To overcome problems related to sample size, we suggest two innovations. First,
we extend the time span from 1999 to 2012, which results in a dataset covering a sufficiently wide time
span of 38 years to allow for some of these countries to change their institutional mandates of banking
supervision more than once.6 For the remaining countries, there is a predominance of jurisdictions that
never changed their supervisory arrangements (16 out of 25) and 7 introduced reforms during this period.
Second, we suggest the use of annual panel data, instead of the five-year average inflation rate ap-
proach. We also undertake the estimation of a dynamic panel data model for inflation analysis, taking
into consideration empirical evidence on the persistence of inflation rates. Even more relevant are the
improvements regarding the estimation approach. Despite the construction of a panel data sample to
measure the effect of the separation of banking supervisory powers from the central bank on inflation
outcomes, previous studies adopt simple estimation methods, such as ordinary least squares, which do
not take into account unobserved effects that are typical of panel data analysis. We suggest the use
of appropriate methods to estimate panels, both static and dynamic, namely the Fixed Effects and the
Arellano-Bover approaches. Finally, we allow for the inclusion of additional explanatory variables that
were not considered in past analyses and that are likely to explain inflation behaviour. Indeed, the mon-
etary policy regime (in particular whether or not an inflation targeting regime is in place), together with
variables that account for the degree to which open economies are exposed to ‘imported’ inflationary
shocks are of crucial importance in studies on this topic.
Estimation results show that the institutional separation of banking supervision from central banks
does not have a significant impact on inflation, suggesting that inflation rates are not systematically
above in countries in which a combined mandate of monetary policy and banking regulation is in place.
This result is robust to time spans not including the financial crisis period and to the dynamic version
of the panel data model. More interestingly, findings suggest that there are other characteristics of the
monetary and financial supervisory architectures that are driving forces of low inflation rates, such as
inflation targeting and deposit insurance systems. Economic factors, such as the output gap, trade and
6This is the case for Ireland which reviewed its banking supervisory institutional arrangement in 2003 and
again in 2010, after the sub-prime crisis, and Luxembourg, which reviewed its supervisory mandate in 1983 and
1999.
2
capital account openness, are also important determinants of inflation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy
and how banking regulation and supervision may affect these channels. Section 3 develops a theoretical
framework that examines the interaction of banking regulation and monetary policy in determining mac-
roeconomic outcomes. Section 4 presents the data and describes the methodology used in the empirical
analysis. The estimation results are presented in Section 5 and finally Section 6 concludes.
2. Review
Monetary policymakers have distinct policy goals from banking supervisors. While the former are
focused on price stability, the latter look after the solvency of the individual banks and the resilience of
the banking system as a whole (microprudential and macroprudential approaches of banking supervision,
respectively). Although they are distinct policy objectives per se, they are likely to positively contribute
to the ultimate goal of macroeconomic stability. In this sense, policy objectives of monetary authorities
and banking supervisors are complementary at least in the long-run, since both promote the economic
and financial conditions needed to achieve stability at the macroeconomic level.
Nonetheless, under specific economic circumstances, the outcomes on financial and price stability
of banking supervision and monetary policy, respectively, can be conflicting, due to the fact that banking
supervision may alter the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The monetary policy propagation
channels more likely to interact with bank stability and ultimately with the stability of the financial
system are mainly three:7 (i) the borrowers’ balance-sheet channel, (ii) the bank lending channel, and
(iii) the risk-taking channel.
Through the borrowers’ balance-sheet and bank lending channels, monetary policy shocks have an
impact not only on the level of interest rates, but also on the size of the external financial premium (i.e.
the difference between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of internal funds)
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995). The borrowers’ balance-sheet and the bank lending channels illustrate
the link between monetary policy decisions and the external finance premium. The borrowers’ balance
sheet channel is based on the assumption that the external finance premium is directly related to the
borrowers’ financial condition, which, in turn, is positively determined by their net worth (which may
be thought as the sum of the liquid assets and the market value of collaterals). Given that the borrowers’
financial situation affects the external finance premium, thus determining the general credit conditions
available to them, variations in the quality of borrowers’ balance-sheets should likewise impact on credit
terms they face and, consequently, on their investment and spending decisions. Changes in interest rates
affect the borrowers’ net worth, at least in two ways. A rise in policy interest rates increases the cost of
liabilities, reducing cash flows and deteriorating borrowers’ financial position. In addition, it decreases
the price of assets that can be used as collateral, deteriorating borrower’s financial position and limiting
the amount of lending provided to borrowers.8
The bank lending channel of monetary policy operates through the banks’ balance-sheet. Specific-
ally, monetary policy may affect the external finance premium by changing the financial intermediaries’
supply of funds. A rise in interest rates induces a reduction in the supply of funds, by raising the rel-
ative funding costs faced by banks, leading to a fall in credit supply. In the case of a decline in credit
supply, the most bank-dependent borrowers, although they may not be completely excluded from credit,
may have to face higher funding costs themselves. The higher costs are likely to increase their external
finance premium and reduce real activity (Bernanke and Gertler 1995).
The risk-taking channel, as first argued by Borio and Zhu (2012), claims that low interest rates boost
assets and collateral prices and if the market believes that this is a sustainable rise, it prompts banks
7Here we address only the transmission channels of conventional monetary policy.
8These are the direct effects from a rise in interest rates. Indirectly, a rise in interest rates may also reduce
demand for a certain product, also affecting firms’ net cash flows and collateral values. In both situations, a tight-
ening in monetary policy interest rates increases the external finance premium, negatively affecting the borrowers’
ability to make loans (i.e. it reduces credit demand in general) (Bernanke and Gertler 1995).
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and borrowers to accept higher risks. Then, a softening of credit standards can follow, which may lead
to an excessive increase in loan supply. By the means of the risk-taking monetary policy channel, low
interest rates reduce risk perceptions and/or improve risk tolerance, thereby encouraging risk taking
behaviour. By promoting risk taking and search for yield behaviours, monetary policy may sow the
seeds for financial instability.
Due to the sharing of transmission channels, interactions of banking supervision and monetary
policy may have conflicting goals. For example, in an economic downturn, monetary policymakers’
response is to avert deflationary pressures by decreasing interest rates, whereas the banking supervisor,
under the same economic circumstances, may favour raising capital requirements to guarantee the resi-
lience of the banking system to economic shocks (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 1993, 1995). The raise in
capital requirements in a deflationary economic environment may lead to a reduction on credit supply,
exacerbating the adverse economic conditions and counteracting the monetary stimulus promoted by the
decrease in interest rates. This example illustrates a potential conflict between the objective of monetary
authorities, which aim at keeping inflation around the target by decreasing interest rates, and banking
supervisors, whose actions may constrain the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Another example comes from a situation in which strong inflationary pressures are detected and the
central bank increases interest rates to counteract the upward developments in prices. Nevertheless, high
increases in interest rates may negatively affect banks’ profitability and solvency, depending on their
magnitude (high interest rates may pose more serious risks to banks’ profitability than lower rates), and
on banks’ balance sheet structures. A high increase in short-term interest rates is likely to be an important
determinant of systemic banking crisis, since it may deteriorate banks’ balance sheets. Consider an
increase in short-term interest rates. Banks adjust by raising the deposits rate. Assuming that the assets
side of the balance sheet is mainly composed by loans with longer maturities at fixed interest rates,
the banks cannot pass through to borrowers the increase in interest rates, and, as a result, the interest
margins compress, reducing banks’ profits. Even if the banks’ loans are provided at a variable rate,
allowing them to pass on the rise in interest rates to borrowers, losses may result from a larger fraction
of non-performing loans, since the debt service augments, making some borrowers unable to meet their
obligations. Therefore, banking supervisors may prefer a gradual monetary policy tightening in the
presence of inflationary pressures than a sudden large increase in interest rates.
Conflicts of this sort challenge the institutional arrangements of monetary policy and banking su-
pervision. In the case central banks are in charge of banking supervision, they have to deal with these
potentially conflicting goals: controlling inflation at the target levels, while maintaining financial stabil-
ity. These decisions may depend on the emphasis that is given to financial stability, but the conflict of
interest argument states that central banks may opt for being more flexible in their inflation mandates,
when financial stability is at stake. Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1993, 1995), among others, argue that
central banks responsible for banking supervision have incentives to be particularly attentive to the ef-
fects of their interest rate decisions on the profitability and stability of the banking sector. Against this
background, it is therefore argued that an inflation bias may arise in institutional mandates characterised
by central banks with supervisory functions, in opposition to an institutional set-up in which banking
regulation is assigned to a separate authority. Inflation bias stems from a less strict monetary policy
stance towards inflation than in the case in which the monetary policymaker is not concerned about fin-
ancial stability. In this sense, the argument can be stated as follows: countries in which central banks
have banking supervisory powers will experience larger inflation rates, on average, than countries in
which banking supervision is assigned to an agency other than the central bank.
The evidence in the literature supports the existence of conflicting goals between monetary policy
makers and bank regulators. Using data from the United States over the period 1990-1998, Ioannidou
(2005) examines whether monetary policy responsibilities have implications in the conduct of the bank
supervision when the Federal Reserve System (Fed) is responsible for both functions.9 The results sug-
9Note that the regulatory architecture of the banking system in the United States is such that the Fed, along
with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),
all share the supervisory powers, but the Fed is the only regulator responsible for monetary policy.
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gest that monetary policy influences Fed’s supervisory actions as it turns out to be more flexible in its
bank6 supervisory role when it tightens the monetary policy stance. Moreover, focusing on 25 indus-
trialised countries over the period 1960-1996, DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) find evidence that average
inflation rate is explained by countries’ institutional mandate when controlling for central bank inde-
pendence from the government. The authors conclude that central banks are less effective in controlling
inflation when they are responsible for the regulation of the banking sector.
In a similar study, Copelovitch and Singer (2008) consider 23 industrial countries from 1975 to 1999
and found empirical evidence that inflation rates have been significantly lower, on average, in countries
where the central bank and the banking supervisor are separate agencies. This effect is conditional on
the choice of the exchange rate regime and the size of the domestic banking sector. In particular, the
separation mandate has a significant negative effect on inflation under floating rates, but this effect is
only observed at middle to high levels of banking sector size.
The interlinkages between monetary policy and banking regulation are poorly addressed in the the-
oretical literature. The few examples of studies investigating upon these issues are from Cecchetti and
Li (2008) and Cecchetti and Kohler (2012). Cecchetti and Li (2008) develop a model through which
the conflict of interest that arise from diverse policy objectives of monetary policymakers and banking
regulators is analysed. The model extends the Blum and Hellwig (1995) banking sector framework to
include a central bank and derive an optimal monetary policy rule, in which the potential procyclicality
of capital requirements is incorporated. The central bank and the banking regulator are separate author-
ities and, due to the fact that monetary policy is usually conducted on the daily basis, whereas banking
regulation change slowly, interactions between the two are modelled by assuming that the central bank
moves first and it is followed by the banking regulator. Results show that the central bank should respond
to the banking system’s balance sheet in order to neutralize the procyclical effect of prudential capital
regulation. Thus, in a situation of financial distress and economic downturn, the optimal monetary policy
stance should decrease interest rates more aggressively when the banking system is capital constrained,
counteracting the procyclicality of capital regulation and, simultaneously, stabilising the aggregate eco-
nomic activity.10 The authors show that capital regulation requires adjustments by monetary authorities,
but they are not an obstacle to the effective conduct of monetary policy. Hence, the potential conflicts
between policies’ objectives can be overcome in a type of game where the central bank response takes
into account whether the banking system is capital constrained.
Cecchetti and Kohler (2012) extend the Cecchetti and Li (2008) methodology to investigate whether
interest rates and capital requirements are interchangeable instruments in stabilising the economy. They
find that the instruments are full substitutes for achieving a standard monetary policy goal of output
and price stability, due to their similarities regarding the transmission mechanism. They also show that
introducing a financial stability goal impacts on the substitutability between interest rates and capital
requirements. Coordination is, in this case, suggested to achieve full substitutability, but the type of
coordination also matters. In the case in which partial coordination is assumed (where the authority in
charge of financial stability moves first), the worse outcomes may be attained, given that the policy-
makers do not take each other’s reactions into their optimisation problem.
3. The Model
The theoretical model that is presented in this section aims to provide an underlying framework to
highlight some of the important issues that have been raised in the literature. We consider a static closed-
economy version of the standard workhorse model that is widely used to describe macroeconomic policy
design problems (see e.g., Svensson 1997 and Clarida et al. 1999) with a banking sector as in Cecchetti
and Kohler (2012). The main objectives of using this model is to examine whether there are any welfare
10Cecchetti and Li (2008) show that, from 1989 to 2000, the Fed has optimally decreased the federal funds rate
in response to a higher leverage ratio, that was embedded in its reaction function to capture greater banking system
distress under capital regulation.
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gains from the inclusion of financial variables on simple policy rules, analyse the interaction of the
transmission channels of monetary policy and financial stability and evaluate the welfare effects.
More specifically, the model that is considered is written in log-linearised form around the steady
state and is summarised below:
yd =  y   yi(i  e)  y(  e) + h (3.1)
ys = (   e) +  (3.2)
`d =  `(  e) + `yy (3.3)
`s = `ly   k: (3.4)
The goods market is described by the aggregate demand yd and aggregate supply ys that depend on
inflation  and are subject to uncorrelated shocks h and  which are assumed to have zero means and
constant variances 2h and 
2
 , respectively. The demand side of the economy depends negatively on the
short-term policy rate i and the lending rate , where e denotes expected inflation. The two rates are
considered to influence different components of aggregate demand. The policy rate (or ‘repo’ rate) has
a direct effect on yd and represents the standard instrument set by the monetary policymaker through
open market operations to stabilise inflation and output gap. The aggregate demand is also affected by
the lending rate  which is determined in the lending market. In particular, the loan demand `d depends
negatively on the price of loans and positively on the output gap y. The supply of loans `s is equal to
the resources available for lending `ly which depends on the state of the economy as more resources
will become available when the economy is growing since more loans repayments are made, minus
the required capital requirement k that the banks have to keep on their balance sheet. As such, k can
also be thought as an alternative instrument that the policymaker can adjust to stabilise the economy in
response to a macroeconomic shock. In this case, by controlling the availability of credit, a policymaker
can affect the aggregate demand indirectly by influencing the price of credit in the lending in a capital
constrained banking sector.11 The coefficients y, yi, `, `y, `l and  are assumed to be positive, while
y is non-negative.
To simplify the analysis, output is normalised to zero and agents are assumed to have rational ex-
pectations, so that expected inflation is zero, but they are unaware of the macroeconomic shocks. In
addition, it is assumed that `d is more sensitive to changes in output than `s so that output has a positive
effect on the equilibrium . This is a sufficient assumption for the model’s parameters which guarantees
the standardised fact that an aggregate supply shock has a negative effect on inflation.
In this environment, the monetary policy maker is assumed to minimise the standard quadratic loss
function as described in the following optimisation problem:
Problem 1.
min
i or k
2 + y2 (3.5)
subject to: (3:1); (3:2); (3:3); (3:4)
the market clearing conditions y = yd = ys and `d = `s:
The policymaker’s inflation aversion is captured by  2 [0; 1) and the targeted inflation rate is set to
zero for simplicity. Solving the optimisation problem yields the policy rule
i =  

y
`yi

k +

y   (1 + y)
1 + 2


yi
+
h
yi
; (3.6)
where k is treated as a constant and  = (`y   `i)=` > 0 denotes the sensitivity of the equilibrium  to
changes in y. Although the effect of h on i is positive as expected, the model’s parameters are assumed
11A version of the model with a banking sector that is not capital constrained can be found in Cecchetti and Li
(2008).
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to satisfy y < 1 which is a sufficient condition so that an aggregate supply shock leads to a rise in 
which in turn requires a negative response of i, in accordance with the standard theory.
There are some interesting implications that are observed from the above policy rule. Firstly, there
is perfect substitutability between the two instruments. Indeed, the policymaker can directly affect the
economy through the credit channel by setting the policy rate to the desired level, for a given level of k.
Alternatively, the policymaker can control the availability of credit in the economy through capital re-
quirements, and consequently the price of credit and affect macroeconomic outcomes though the banks’
balance sheet channel for a given i. This is due to the linearity of the above rule in the two instruments
which results from the quadratic form of the loss function and the linearity of the model. 12 Therefore,
instrument independence does not have any effect on this model as the same welfare outcome can be
achieved by either instrument. Notice also that it is only the supply shock that affects macroeconomic
outcomes as either instrument can be adjusted to reverse the effects of demand shocks.
From the above optimal policy rule it follows that the inclusion of financial variables in the interest
rate rule does not always improve welfare as this depends on the macroeconomic shock. The role of
the financial system in this economy is captured by the lending rate which in turn is influenced by the
characteristics of the banking sector. For a policymaker that ignores the effect of lending market on
macroeconomic outcomes, the interest rate rule is described by equation (3.6) where y = 0. In this
case, a supply shock will also influence yd through its effect on  and will result to an increase in the
welfare loss as the instrument does not adjust sufficiently to bring down inflation and output to the
optimal levels. In contrast, however, the effect of a demand shock on output is fully neutralised by the
adjustment in the policy rate and consequently it has no effect on the banks’ balance sheet. As such, the
welfare loss resulting from an aggregate demand shock remains the same independently of whether the
policymaker considers the influence of the lending rate when setting the instrument under control.
Moreover, the model can be extended to examine the interaction between the two policy transmission
channels in attaining the objectives of monetary and financial stability. Although monetary stability is
well defined in the literature and commonly described by the loss function in equation (3.5), the financial
stability goal is subject to debate. As credit creation is frequently associated with financial imbalances,
popular measures of financial stability that have been introduced in the literature include banks credit to
GDP (see Angelini et al. 2012) and the leverage ratio (see Valencia 2014), where the latter is constant
in this simple set up of the financial sector that is consider. Instead, similarly to Curdia and Woodford
(2010) and Teranishi (2012) who argue that policymakers should respond to credit spreads as suggested
by the empirical findings, financial stability is captured by the deviation of the lending rate from the
policy rate.
In this general case, the optimisation problem of a policymaker with two objectives is given by
Problem 2.
min
i or k
(  i)2 + (1  )(2 + y2) (3.7)
subject to:(3:1); (3:2); (3:3); (3:4)
the market clearing conditions y = yd = ys and `d = `s;
where  is the weight that is assigned to the objective of financial stability.
The optimal policy rule for a policymaker with two mandates but one available instrument can be
derived by solving the above optimisation problem. As capital requirements do not adjust as frequently
as the policy rate to steer the economy back to equilibrium due to the uncertainty that it creates on
banks’ balance sheet, the policymaker is restrained to one instrument. In the extreme scenario where
the policymaker values only monetary stability, the optimal policy rule is described by equation (3.6)
whereas if the policymaker values only financial stability, the policy rule indicates that either instrument
adjusts such that the lending rate does not deviate from the policy rate. Instrument substitutability is
maintained for these extreme scenarios where the first-best welfare outcome can be achieved. However,
12In this case, the capital requirements rule can be obtain by solving for k in equation (3.6).
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when mandates are combined so that 0 <  < 1, only second-best welfare outcomes are attainable. The
resulting welfare loss depends on the policymaker’s instrument under control and the macroeconomic
shock that disturbs the economy.
Depending on the instrument used, there are two transmission channels of policymaking that interact
with each other. One is through the credit channel where a change in policy rate has a direct effect on
y and an indirect effect on , and the other channel is through the capital requirements that has a direct
effect on  and an indirect effect on y. The transmission channels interact in a way that they lessen each
others effect on macroeconomic variables. A policymaker that raises the policy rate in response to a
shock, reduces inflation and output due to its effect on aggregate demand. However, since loan demand
is more sensitive to changes in output than loan supply (i.e.  > 0), the fall in output results in a fall
of the equilibrium lending rate which in turn stimulates the aggregate demand, crowding out some of
the initial drop in output. Alternatively, if the policymaker raises capital requirements, the loan supply
and consequently the equilibrium lending rate will fall, leading to a reduction in aggregate demand and
a fall in output and inflation. As before, the drop in output leads to a reduction in the lending rate which
stimulates the aggregate demand and crowds out some of the initial drop in output.
The welfare effect from pursuing both price and financial stability with one instrument depends upon
whether the two objectives are conflicting or complement each other for a given policy response. The
relationship between the objectives relies on the instrument used and the type of shock the economy
experiences. In particular, for an economy that experiences an aggregate demand shock, price and
financial stabilisation policies are complementary when the policymaker controls the policy rate, and
conflicting when controlling capital requirements. This is because, in response to a positive shock for
example, an increase in the policy rate does not only reduce the impact on inflation and output but also
reduces the spread between the two rates. However, the extend of the policy rate adjustment depends on
the weight that is assigned on each objective. Hence, although the first best outcome is not attainable
with a single instrument, control over the policy rate leads to a welfare improvement to both objectives
following a demand shock.
In contrast, the direction of adjustment of capital requirements depends on the objective pursued
by the policymaker. If a greater weight in placed on price stability, capital requirements should rise in
response to the shock in order to bring down inflation and output. However, this results in a further
increase in the lending rate and consequently to a greater dispersion between the two rates which de-
teriorates the financial stability goal. In a similar manner, when the focus is on financial stability, the
decrease in capital requirements enhances financial stability by reducing the spread between the two
rates. The resulting lower lending rate leads to a further increase in inflation and output and therefore to
a greater welfare loss due to monetary instability.
Contrary to the demand shock, when the shock comes from the supply side of the economy, price
and financial stabilisation policies are complementary when the policymaker controls banks’ capital
requirements, and conflicting when controlling the policy rate. The intuition behind this result is the
same as above when considering that the supply shock causes inflation and output to move in opposing
directions. More specifically, a drop in capital requirements in response to a positive shock for example,
leads to a fall in the lending rate which reduces the spread between the two rates and moves inflation
back towards its initial value. The extend of the adjustment depends again on the weight that is assigned
on each objective. Thus, control over capital requirements leads to a welfare improvement to both
objectives following a supply shock.
However, the direction of adjustment of the policy rate depends on the objective that is valued the
most by the policymaker. If a greater weight is placed on price stability, the policy rate should fall in
response to the shock to bring back inflation close to the targeted value. However, the fall in the policy
rate and the associated increase in the lending rate yields a greater dispersion between the two rates, and
therefore a greater welfare loss due to financial instability. In contrast, when the focus is on financial
stability, an increase in the policy rate improves financial stability but leads to further deterioration of
price stability as it leads to a further fall in inflation.
It is important to note that certain parameters of the model have an important role to play on the
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complementarity between the two objectives that determine the welfare outcomes. In the case of the
aggregate demand shock, although the lending and policy rates move in opposite directions, the loss
from financial instability is reduced for any parameter values provided that the aggregate demand is
more sensitive to changes in the policy rate than to changes in the lending rate via capital requirements,
or y < yi. It is reasonable to expect that the direct effect of the policy rate is more effective in
influencing macroeconomic outcomes as less frictions are involved in the policy transmission. In terms
of the aggregate supply shock, the complementarity result is generalised provided that the policymaker
is sufficiently inflation averse such that the benefits from pricing stabilisation outweigh the cost of a
greater output gap.
4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis has the purpose to investigate the interactions of monetary and financial su-
pervisory institutional arrangements. In particular, we aim at assessing the validity of the conflicting
goals argument, by analysing the impact of a combined mandate of monetary policy and banking su-
pervision on inflation rates. We also consider the impact on inflation from other components of the
monetary and financial supervisory architecture, namely the degree of independence of central banks,
whether they were assigned an explicit inflation targeting mandate, or whether the country has a deposit
insurance scheme to protect depositors from bank failures.
4.1. Data
We consider annual time series data for 25 OECD countries over the period 1975-2012. The depend-
ent variable is the logarithm of the annual inflation rate while, in addition to the explanatory variables
considered in related empirical literature,13 a number of other regressors is included in the analysis,
since we expect they can be also related to inflation.14 The group of regressors are divided in four cat-
egories: institutional, external, economic and banking structure. Descriptive statistics for each one of
the variables are presented in the Appendix, together with a summary of the expected impact of each
explanatory variable on inflation rates, which can be found in Tables 2.8.1 and 2.8.3, respectively.
4.2. Institutional Factors
The characteristics of the monetary and financial supervisory architecture in each country are cap-
tured by several variables. The main institutional variable incorporated in this study controls for mon-
etary policy and banking regulation institutional arrangements in each country. This variable is referred
to as separate banking supervision and represents the mandate of each central bank in terms of banking
supervision responsibilities and captures its impact on inflation rates behaviour. This is captured by a
dummy that takes value of 1 if the function of banking regulation is assigned to an authority independ-
ent from the central bank, and value of 0 if banking supervision is a central bank’s responsibility (the
latter case refers to a combined institutional arrangement).15 The classification of countries into these
13See DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999), Copelovitch and Singer (2008) and Aisen and Veiga (2006).
14Table 2.8.2 in the Appendix provides the definition and data sources for each explanatory variable considered
in the econometric analysis.
15Note that the variable separate banking supervision does not account for whether a separate banking supervi-
sion also oversees securities markets and/or insurance companies. The classification only captures the allocation
(or exclusion) of banking supervision to central banking responsibilities. The classification of countries in terms of
separate and combined institutional mandates is presented in Table 2.1 in Appendix B. For the euro area Member
States, we consider a combined banking supervision regime after their entrance in the European Monetary Union,
in 1999 (except for Greece which joined the European Monetary Union in 2001), due to the fact that national
central banks are part of the Euro system, which also comprises the European Central Bank, responsible for the
conduct of monetary policy. It can also be argued, though, that the European Monetary Union should be treated as
a separate mandate, given that monetary policy is centralised in the European Central Bank. We perform a sensit-
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two groups (i.e. separate banking supervision or combined mandate) is based on information disclosed
in the Bank Regulation and Supervision Surveys (updated June 2008 and 2012) provided by the World
Bank, which collects information regarding the main aspects of regulation and supervision from super-
visory authorities located in 143 jurisdictions for the years 2008 and 2012.16 Data is complemented with
other information sources. We consulted Copelovitch and Singer (2008)’s classification and in the cases
for which there was uncertainty about the type of mandate, the central banks and supervisory agencies
websites were also employed for cross-check. The survey by Courtis (2011) on international supervision
arrangements was also useful to confirm our previous classifications. Still, there are some countries for
which a clear-cut separation of banking supervision responsibilities is difficult to undertake.
Table 1 shows the evolution of inflation rates and the institutional arrangements in the 25 countries
included in our sample along the period 1975-2012. Over the sample period, inflation rates decreased
substantially: in 1975, the global sample inflation was 13.5% on average, continuously falling during
the 1980’s and the 1990’s, and stabilising around 2% in the 2000’s (i.e. in 2012 the country average
inflation was 2.2%).
Table 1: Mandates of banking supervision and average inflation for 25 countries.
Year Separate Mandate Combined Mandate Inflation Rate
1975 8 17 13.5%
1980 8 17 13.4%
1985 7 18 8.0%
1990 7 18 6.1%
1995 7 18 3.3%
2000 12 13 2.5%
2005 14 11 2.1%
2010 13 12 2.2%
2012 11 14 2.2%
According to our classification, banking supervision responsibilities were assigned to the central
bank in 17 OECD countries in 1975, whereas only 8 countries preferred to allocate this responsibility
to an independent authority. This distribution remained stable until late 1990’s, period from which
it is observed an increase in the number of countries that have opted to separate banking supervisory
responsibilities from the central bank. In the early 2000’s, there was a balance in this sample between
countries with separate institutional arrangements of banking supervision and monetary policy (12) and
countries with combined mandates (13). In the 2000 decade, the number of countries with separate
banking supervision mandates outpaced the number of countries with combined regimes, reaching a
peak of 14 countries out of 25 from 2003 to 2009. After the onset of the financial crisis of 2007/2008, and
as a response to it, some countries reformed their institutional settings of banking supervision towards its
allocation to the central bank. This tendency is already to some extent reflected in 2012 figures, which
illustrate a decrease in the number of countries with separate banking supervision mandates, from 14 in
2009 to 11 in 2012.
This can be considered a rich dataset in the sense that it covers a sufficiently wide time span to allow
for some of these countries to change their institutional mandates of banking supervision more than once.
This is the case for Ireland which reviewed its banking supervisory institutional arrangement in 2003
and again in 2010, after the sub-prime crisis, and Luxembourg, which changed its supervisory mandate
ivity analysis to assess for the latter case, in which we assume a separate institutional mandate between monetary
policy and banking supervision, whenever the national central bank is in charge of supervisory responsibilities.
The estimation results do not change substantially and are shown in Appendix B, Tables 2.8.7 and 2.8.8.
16This classification is based on the answers given by the countries in this sample to questions 12.1 of the World
Bank survey for 2008 utilized by the authors to compile the dataset. The questions are stated as follows: in the
2008 survey, “What body or agency supervises banks?”, or, in the 2012 update, “What body/agency supervises
commercial banks for prudential purposes?”.
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in 1983 and 1999. Iceland and the United Kingdom also have recently reformed their supervisory
arrangements for the second time since 1975, but since their entering into effect was in 2013 and 2014
respectively, these changes are not covered by our database. For the remaining countries, there is a
predominance of jurisdictions that never changed their supervisory arrangements (16 out of 25) from
1975 to 2012 and only 5 introduced reforms during this period.
There is a large literature following Cukierman et al. (1992) claiming that the degree of independence
of the central bank (thereafter CBI) has a significant negative impact on inflation outcomes. Accordingly,
it is expected that a country with a higher degree of central bank independence will also experience lower
average inflation rates. The CBI variable used in this study is based on the work of Arnone et al. (2007)
who update the Cukierman et al. (1992) and Grilli et al. (1991) measures for central bank political
and economic autonomy. Political autonomy is interpreted as the power of central banks to define
and implement monetary policy, whereas economic autonomy evaluates the central banks operational
independence. Following the literature, we assume that CBI measures computed in the late 80’s do not
vary until 2003, the year for which Arnone et al. (2007) update the index.17
The insurance of bank deposits is another common pillar of the financial supervisory architecture.
Deposit insurance systems are considered necessary for the stability of the financial system and the
protection of depositors. In 1933, the United States was the first country to establish a national deposit
insurance system, but it was only over the last quarter of the twentieth century that explicit deposit
insurance has spread across countries, rising from 12 in 1974 to 71 in 1999 (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane
2002). Currently, most OECD countries and an increasing number of developing countries feature some
sort of explicit depositor protection.
A country with an explicit deposit insurance scheme that provides depositors with protection from
losses in the event of a bank failure will experience lower average inflation rates. This is because the
central bank can be aggressive on its inflation mandate as it is less concerned about the effect of interest
rates on banking stability (Copelovitch and Singer 2008). In our dataset, the deposit insurance variable
takes value of 1 for countries with explicit deposit insurance and of 0 otherwise. The classification uses
information from the World Bank Deposit Insurance Around the World Dataset, from 1975 to 2003, and
from the International Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI), for the remaining years.
To account for the effects of inflation targeting on inflation behaviour, a dummy variable is intro-
duced taking the value of 1 at the year that a country adopted inflation targeting and onwards,18 and the
value of 0 in the remaining cases based on Roger (2010)’s classification. Since this approach pursues
an explicit public commitment to control inflation as the principal policy goal, we expect that a country
that has adopted inflation targeting will experience lower inflation rates.
In addition, we include a “Great Moderation Period” dummy variable to control for the persistent
decline of inflation rates (and their volatilities) in the developed world since the early 1980’s. The
breakpoint is 1984, according to McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), the year from which we consider
the beginning of the great moderation period. We build a dummy that takes value of 1 from 1984 until
2007, when the crisis started. The remaining years covered in the dataset are assigned a value of 0.
We also condition our inflation estimations on an exchange rate regime variable that takes value of 1
for all varieties of “hard” fixed exchange rates and 0 for floating or managed floating regimes. Data
are based on the International Monetary Fund classification by Ilzetzki et al. (2008). Finally, in what
institutional factors are concerned, euro membership is included to control for the euro area countries’
specific monetary policy mandate and it takes the value of 1 from 1999 onwards for the euro area member
countries, except for Greece that entered the European Monetary Union two years later (2001).
17As CBI measures are usually computed for specific periods of time, researchers circumvent the problem of
using a CBI index in panels by considering that CBI measures do not change significantly across time. We built
the dataset based on the same assumption.
18In our sample, the countries that use inflation targeting are New Zealand (since 1990), Canada (since 1991),
United Kingdom (since 1992), Sweden (since 1993), Australia (since 1993), Iceland (since 2001) and Norway
(since 2001). Finland and Spain adopted inflation targeting, in 1993 and 1995 respectively, but abandoned it when
they entered the Euro Area in 1999.
11
4.3. External and Economic Factors
In order to capture the impact of external factors on inflation outcomes, we consider the following
explanatory variables: trade openness, capital account openness and oil imports as percentage of GDP.
Trade openness is measured as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP and data are
taken from the Comparative Political Dataset (1960-2011). An inverse relation between trade openness
and inflation is expected as more open economies benefit from lower inflation, on average. According to
Romer (1993), the degree of openness of the economies affects inflation through two different channels.
First, a more closed economy has a higher incentive to engage in surprise inflation since its impact on
the real depreciation is less costly, given that the fraction of imported goods is lower in this economy.19
Second, openness affects the output-inflation trade-off: for a given increase in output, the rise in domestic
prices will be higher as more open the economy is, given the exchange rates disciplining effect. Thus,
monetary policymakers incentives to engage in expansionary policies are lower in more open economies,
and therefore inflation is expected to be smaller. There is a broad empirical support for this view, in
which a strong and robust negative impact of openness on inflation outcomes is shown to be present.
Capital account openness is measured using the Chinn-Ito index, developed in Chinn and Ito (2008)
for the period ranging from 1970 to 2012.20 This index accounts for restrictions on capital account
transactions, current account transactions, requirements of the surrender of exports proceeds and the
presence of multiple exchange rates. Similarly to trade openness, empirical evidence shows a negative
relationship between financial openness and inflation (Gruben and McLeod 2002, Gupta 2008). For oil
import countries, we expect that oil prices will have a positive effect on inflation. The data for the value
of oil imports is from the World Economic Outlook Database, published by the International Monetary
Fund. We consider the oil imports as percentage of national GDP, to account for the different dimensions
across countries.
To account for the effect of economic conditions on inflation, we include as regressors the out-
put gap, currency and banking crisis. Output gap measures the difference between the actual level of
national output and the estimated potential level. A positive output gap implies upward pressures on
inflation. Currency and banking crisis are dummy variables that take value of 1 whenever the country
is experiencing a currency or a banking crisis.21 The impact of banking crisis on inflation depends to a
certain extent on the monetary stance that can be maintained during a crisis and whether inflation is kept
as the primary policy objective (Garcia-Herrero 1997). Currency crisis, on the other hand, may have
inflationary consequences.
4.4. Banking Sector Factors
In order to capture the possible influence on inflation outcomes of the characteristics of the banking
system in each country, we control for the size of the banking system, which is measured by domestic
credit over GDP. In our sample of industrialised countries, there is significant variation in the size of the
banking systems. While the weight of the banking system in the total economy has an average around
85%, the variation across countries ranges from 15% to 311% (see Table 2.8.1, in Appendix).
As argued by Copelovitch and Singer (2008), central banks with regulatory powers may be more
concerned with banking stability when facing a large banking system relative to the overall size of
the economy, due to the reputation costs stemming from bank distress. In institutional frameworks in
which central banks are also in charge of banking supervision, a large banking system may aggravate
the inflation bias - therefore, we may expect the size of the banking system to have a positive impact
19In these models it is assumed that domestic and foreign goods are not perfect substitutes.
20The Chinn-Ito index is taken from the Comparative Political Dataset (1960-2009).
21Banking crisis data is based on Glick and Hutchison (1999), except for Australia and USA, for which data
comes from Caprio and Klingebiel (2003). For the remaining years (2000-2010), data comes from Laeven and
Valencia (2008). Currency crisis data is based on Glick and Hutchison (1999), except for Australia and USA, for
which the data comes from Laeven and Valencia (2008). For the time span 2000-2010, data comes from Laeven
and Valencia (2008).
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on inflation outcomes, since when the banking system contributes to a larger share of the domestic
economy, central banks may fear to a greater extent the monetary policy effects on bank stability.
4.5. Model Specifications
The following panel data regression model is adopted to estimate the relationship between inflation
rates and institutional arrangements of banking regulation and supervision:
i;t = 0 + 1separate supi;t + Xi;t + vi + ui;t; (4.1)
where i;t is the (log) inflation rate for country i in year t, separate supi;t is a binary variable that takes
value of 1 if the country is classified as having a separate banking supervision at time t and value of 0
otherwise, Xi;t is a vector of control variables, as described in the previous subsection, vi accounts for
unobserved country specific effects and ui;t is the error term.
We consider three alternative specifications of this model. Model 1 is a reduced form version of
model in Equation (4.1), in which the vector of controls is not included, keeping only the variable of
interest, separate supi;t. Model 2 is the regression model in Equation (4.1), Models 1 and 2 are called
hereafter static panel data models. Model 3 is an extension of Model 2, allowing for the study of inflation
dynamics, by adding to the vector of regressors the one period lagged inflation:
i;t = 0 + 1separate supi;t + 2i;t 1 + Xi;t + vi + ui;t; (4.2)
The inclusion of lagged inflation as an independent variable is motivated by a strand of the literature
regarding a hybrid version of the Phillips curve, in which inflation depends on a combination of expected
future inflation and lagged inflation.22 The lagged inflation term in the hybrid Phillips curve has the
purpose of capturing inflation persistence. As point out by Gali and Gertler (1999), empirically, the
hybrid Phillips curve provides good characterization of inflation dynamics at the annual frequency.
We suggest the use of annual panel data, with a time-series dimension (T = the number of years)
of 38 years, from 1975 to 2012, and a cross-section pool (N = the number of countries) of 25 advanced
countries, which allows to capture the richness of the dynamics of many variables, while simultaneously
integrating cross-country heterogeneity in the means of the dependent variable. Nonetheless, given that
in panel data is highly likely that country-specific characteristics (such as cultural factors, geographic
location, language, etc.) are correlated with the explanatory variables,23 we resort to panel data estima-
tion with fixed effects,24 using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.25 Fixed Effects is an estimation
method that deals directly with this source of correlation, by applying a means-deviation transformation
to each variable, in which the mean is computed at the country level. This transformation rules out the
unobserved individual effect from the original model and, in consequence, it enables to obtain coeffi-
cients on the regressors that do not suffer from bias due to the omission of relevant individual attributes.
With respect toModel 3, the dynamic panel data version of model in (4.1), the inclusion of the lagged
dependent variable i;t 1 in a model with unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effects turns the
OLS estimator inconsistent, since the error term is positively correlated with the explanatory variable
i;t 1 (Arellano and Bond 1991). This correlation does not disappear as the number of individuals in the
sample gets larger. Moreover, the Fixed Effects estimator is also generally inconsistent, namely in the
case when N tends to infinity and T is fixed, because of the problem of incidental parameters (Nickell
22See Gali and Gertler (1999) for an overview of the Phillips curve literature, from the traditional version to the
hybrid approach.
23Namely with the variable of interest in this analysis, which refers to the separate banking supervision, since,
as already mentioned, the institutional arrangements of banking supervision are influenced by the Anglo-saxon
and the German traditions.
24Random effects, on the other hand, assume that the unobserved individual effects are uncorrelated with the
observed exogenous variables.
25In terms of estimation methods, previous studies, such as DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and Copelovitch and
Singer (2008), adopt pooled Ordinary Least Squares with corrected standard errors.
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1981). However, contrary to the OLS estimator, the Fixed Effects estimator becomes consistent when
both T and N tend to infinity.
On the other hand, Arellano-Bond estimator is a dynamic panel data estimator with the advantage
that is designed to fit linear functional relationships with a dependent variable that depends on its own
past values, additional independent variables, fixed individual effects and heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation within individuals but not across them (Roodman 2009). In addition, it is a more appropriate
estimator for short, wide dynamic panels (i.e. small T , large N type of panel datasets). Arellano-Bond
estimator (also known as Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimator) thereby corrects those problems
by first-differencing all regressors to eliminate vi (i.e. unobserved country specific effects) and produce
an equation estimable by instrumental variables:
D:i;t = 0 + 1D:separate supi;t + 2D:i;t 1 + D:Xi;t +D:ui;t; (4.3)
whereD stands for the first-difference operator and the variables and parameters are defined as in Equa-
tion (4.2).
Dynamic panel data estimators do not assume that good instruments are available outside the imme-
diate dataset. Instead, they assume that the only available instruments are internal-based on lags of the
instrumented variables.26 The Arellano-Bond estimator uses as instruments the levels of the dependent
variable lagged two or more periods, the levels of endogenous variables, the lagged two or more periods
and the first differences of the strictly exogenous regressors, which are used as their own instruments.
In the case we assume that the explanatory variables are not correlated with the individual effects,
there are more moment conditions that can be used as instruments for the levels equation, such as the
lagged differences of the covariates and of the dependent variable (see Arellano and Bover 1995). The
Arellano-Bond difference GMM estimation is thereby augmented by estimating simultaneously two
equations, one in differences and another in levels, which are distinctly instrumented, originating the
system GMM estimator. As shown by Blundell and Bond (1998), this system GMM estimator is more
suitable to that of Arellano-Bond estimator when the dependent variable and/or the independent variables
are persistent.
Both difference and system GMM estimators are more adequate for small T , largeN samples, while
Fixed Effects estimator is suitable for a dynamic panel data when we have a sample with large T and
small N type of panel data, because the panel data bias tends to disappear as the T component expands.
Taking into account that our panel dataset features a T = 38 and N = 25, it can be considered one with
large T and small N type of panel data, Fixed Effects estimator seems to be more adequate to estimate
the dynamic version of the model.
Against this background, considering the features of a dynamic panel data model and recognizing
the unsuitability of the OLS estimator for these type of models, we opt to estimate the dynamic panel
data model specification (Model 3) using both Fixed Effects and Arellano-Bover estimators.
5. Estimation Results
5.1. Static Panel Data Models
The regression results based on the estimation of Model 1 and Model 2 for the period 1975-2012
are presented in Table 2.2, which are, respectively, the reduced and the full versions in Equation (4.1).
The estimation procedure for both models follows the Fixed Effects estimator. F test and Wald Chi2
statistics for the global statistical significance are also reported.
26Nonetheless, they allow for the inclusion of instruments from outside the dataset.
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Table 2: Estimation results (1975-2007).
Dependent Variable: Model 1 Model 2
(log) inflation Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Constant 0.606
 0.966
(0.031) (0.130)
Separate Banking Supervision  0.229 -0.036
(1 = Yes) (0.083) (0.052)
Inflation Targeting -  0.165
(1 = Yes) (0.065)
CBI -  0.130
(index) (0.097)
Deposit Insurance -  0.117
(1 = Yes) (0.056)
Exchange Rate Reg. -  0.052
(1 = fixed) (0.048)
Euro Area Member -  0.008
(1 = Yes) (0.047)
Time -  0.019
(1 = 1975; . . . 38=2012) (0.004)
Great Moderation -  0.133
(1=1984-2007) (0.041)
Domestic Credit - 0.01
(% of GDP) (0.000)
Output Gap - 2.428

(0.654)
Banking Crisis -  0.011
(1 = Yes) (0.046)
Currency Crisis - 0.049
(1 = Yes) (0.064)
Trade Openness - 0.003

(0.002)
Capital Account -  0.073
Openness (0.021)
Oil imports - 2.245
(% GDP) (0.931)
Observations 961 639
No Countries 25 24
F Test/Wald Chi2 Test 7.65 171.15
(global significance) (1, 24) (15, 23)
R squared (within) 0.02 0.56
p  :10; p  :05; p  :01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
Focusing first on the institutional factors of inflation dynamics and starting with the estimation res-
ults obtained for the variable separate banking supervision, we observe that it is statistically significant
in the reduced form of the model (Model 1) in accordance with DiNoia and DiGiorgio (1999) and
Copelovitch and Singer (2008) findings. However, this result does not subsist when we control for
more explanatory variables (Model 2), including the remaining institutional factors. Estimation results
of Model 1 suggest thereby that, at a first glance, it seems to exist an inflation bias, as advocate by the
conflicting goals thesis, but it tends to disappear when other factors are controlled for, as in Model 2.
These findings are robust to alternative specifications of the variable separate banking supervision,
namely for (i) countries for which doubts concerning the classification of the institutional mandates
were raised (this was the case of Australia, Austria, Denmark and Finland), and (ii) countries which
joined the euro area. As an alternative option, for this latter group it was assumed that the institutional
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arrangement is separate from the moment it joined the euro area, regardless of the central bank having or
not supervisory powers. This assumption is based on the argument that the conduct of monetary policy
in the euro area was centralised within the European Central Bank, leaving the national central banks
powerless in this regard.27 Estimation results obtained under this sensitivity analysis are reported in
Appendix 2.8.3.
Regarding the other components of the monetary and financial supervisory architecture, our find-
ings from the estimation of Model 2 show that inflation targeting countries benefit from lower inflation
rates than countries that do not pursue this specific type of monetary policy mandate. The explanatory
variable inflation targeting is statistically significant and it has an estimated impact on inflation rates of
approximately  15%.28 By the same token, according to our results, a country with an explicit deposit
insurance scheme will have inflation rates that are on average  11% lower than a country without de-
posit protection, all else equal. The other institutional variables, such as central bank independence and
exchange rate regimes, appear to have had a less significant effect on inflation outcomes.
In particular, it is worth discussing in more detail the results for central bank independence. There is
a vast literature investigating the impact of central bank independence on inflation rates which argues that
central bank independence is the main institutional factor affecting inflation outcomes. In our regression
models, although central bank independence enters the regression with the expected negative sign, it is
not statistically significant. Empirical evidence on the impact of the degree of central bank independence
on inflation rates is not fully conclusive. Although early studies indicate a significant negative effect of
CBI on inflation rates (Grilli et al. 1991, Cukierman et al. 1992), recent empirical work fails to find a
strong impact (Mangano 1998, Crowe and Meade 2007).
The CBI variable used in our analysis is based on the work of Arnone et al. (2007), which update a
de jure measure of independence (following Cukierman et al. 1992) and it assesses regulations only. As
suggested by Cukierman et al. (1992), de factomeasures of central bank independence are also important
to assess how regulations work in practice. Our results seem to suggest that the degree of legal inde-
pendence per se is not sufficient to guarantee a significant negative impact on inflation outcomes. The
lack of significance of central bank independence may be due to measurement issues (given that it does
not address how regulations are implemented), which perhaps could lead to a theoretical reconsideration
of the association between central bank independence, the banking structure and inflation.
Explanatory variables such as output gap, size of the banking system as percentage of GDP and great
moderation period are also statistically significant and the estimated coefficients enter the regression with
the expected sign.
Furthermore, our results suggest that a more open economy in terms of trade and capital flows has
a statistically significant impact on inflation rates, all else equal. The results for the degree of capital
account openness are consistent with previous empirical evidence by Gupta (2008) and consistent with
Copelovitch and Singer (2008), since they also observe a negative significant effect of capital account
openness on inflation rates. As for the degree of trade openness, results suggest a positive significant
impact on inflation outcomes, which contradicts previous empirical findings (see, for instance, Romer
1993), in which a negative significant impact is reported. The effect on inflation rates of the weight of oil
imports in GDP is also statistically significant, implying that, in sum, external factors have an important
role in determining inflation behaviour.
The positive (although modest in magnitude) statistically significant impact on inflation rates of
the size of the banking system relative to the economy suggests that countries characterised by large
banking sectors experience, on average, higher inflation rates than countries in which the banking sector
27With the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 2013, which conferred banking supervisory
powers upon the European Central Bank, additional issues regarding the classification of the euro area countries in
terms of their banking supervisory mandates will be raised. The SSM Regulation empowers the ECB to supervise
the significant banks in each Member State, but the responsibility to supervise the less significant banks is still
under in the national supervisory authorities domain.
28Since the dependent variable in our model is the log of inflation, the coefficients of dummy variables should
be read as e^   1.
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is small. According to these findings, banking system features may be relevant determinants of the
regulatory central bank’s bias. It would be interesting to empirically explore further this result in future
analysis, not only by considering the size of the banking sector, but also its degree of concentration and
how these features may impact on the transmission channels of monetary policy and influence inflation
outcomes. There are two distinct views in the literature concerning the impact of banking concentration
on the monetary policy transmission mechanism. The more common perspective states that higher
concentration implies less competition, hence higher profitability due to greater interest margins between
deposits and loans, and therefore a less efficient transmission mechanism of monetary policy to the real
economy. In this case, we would expect higher bank concentration measures to lead to higher levels
of inflation. Alternatively, the efficient-structure theory (Demsetz 1973) argues that cost-efficient banks
could drive cost-inefficient banks out of the market and increase their market share, which would lead to
higher concentration and greater profitability. In this case, profitability is generated due to cost efficiency
and the transmission of monetary policy is not affected as interest margins remain unchanged. Therefore,
according to this approach, a higher degree of concentration in the banking industry would lead to lower
inflation rates.
Finally, results suggest that the remaining explanatory variables, such as the ones that control for the
occurrence of currency and banking crisis, appeared to have had a less significant impact on inflation
in industrialised countries. This finding may be related to the fact that the occurrence of banking and
currency crisis is very small along the period from 1975 to 2012 in our sample. In fact, industrialised
countries, such as the ones included in our database, have more mature banking systems and economies,
thus they are not so prone to be affected by banking and currency crisis as emergent or less developed
economies.
In summary, estimation results of the static panel data models suggest that the monetary and financial
supervisory architecture has an influence on inflation rates in industrialised countries. Inflation rates are
mainly affected by institutional factors, such as inflation targeting and deposit insurance, but not by the
institutional mandates of monetary policy and banking supervision. Other factors, such as the degree
of openness of the economy or economic developments are also important determinants of inflation
behaviour.
5.2. Dynamic Panel Data Models
Table ?? reports the estimation results for the dynamic panel data model in Equation (4.2), obtained
from using both Fixed Effects and Arellano-Bover estimators. The main conclusion is that the estimation
results obtained for the static version of the model (Model 2) are fully supported by the estimation
results for the dynamic panel data version (Model 3), particularly in what regards the lack of evidence
of a significant impact of the institutional arrangements of banking supervision and monetary policy on
inflation outcomes.29 Estimation results confirm, though, that one year lagged inflation is statistically
significant in explaining current inflation behaviour and it has, as expected, a positive impact on inflation.
Institutional factors such as deposit insurance schemes, belonging to the euro area, the exchange
rates regime or even inflation targeting practices do not reveal empirical evidence of their influence on
inflation rates. Exception is made to the independence of central banks, which has a significant impact
on inflation when a dynamic panel data model is considered.
External factors such as oil imports as percentage of GDP and the degree of capital openness have a
statistically significant impact on inflation. This result is robust in the sense that it holds across different
model specifications. The same is observed for the output gap: its impact on inflation is positive, as
expected according to the Phillips Curve theory, and very strong. The negative influence of the great
29This finding holds even in the case we consider raw inflation as the dependent variable (instead of logarithm of
inflation). We have performed the estimation of Models 1-3 assuming an alternative measure of inflation rates, and
we employed the same estimation procedure. Results obtained in this robustness test stress the lack of statistical
significant of the variable separate banking supervision also in this model specification. Estimation results are
available upon request.
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moderation period on inflation outcomes is also statistically significant according to the dynamic panel
data estimation results.
As an additional robustness check, the estimation of the three models was undertaken for the period
from 1975-2007, a time span that does not include the financial crisis period which begun in 2008.
Results are shown in Appendix 2.8.3 - Robustness Checks, Tables 2.8.9 and 2.8.10, and are consistent
to the ones obtained for a larger period.
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Table 3: Estimation results (1975-2007).
Dependent Variable: Model 3
(log) inflation Fixed Effects Arellano-Bover
Constant 0.554
 0.783
(0.089) (0.134)
Lagged Inflation (t  1) 0.356
 0.384
(0.048) (0.095)
Separate Banking Supervision  0.012 -0.039
(1 = Yes) (0.050) (0.028)
Inflation Targeting  0.102 0.023
(1 = Yes) (0.040) (0.046)
CBI  0.032  0.117
(index) (0.062) (0.054)
Deposit Insurance  0.085  0.019
(1 = Yes) (0.041) (0.035)
Exchange Rate Reg.  0.029  0.025
(1 = fixed) (0.024) (0.023)
Euro Area Member  0.033 0.058
(1 = Yes) (0.028) (0.039)
Time  0.012  0.008
(1 = 1975; . . . 38=2012) (0.002) (0.003)
Great Moderation  0.101  0.091
(1=1984-2007) (0.030) (0.036)
Domestic Credit 0.001 0.000
(% of GDP) (0.000) (0.000)
Output Gap 2.653
 1.986
(0.501) (0.638)
Banking Crisis  0.010 0.011
(1 = Yes) (0.033) (0.027)
Currency Crisis 0.040  0.007
(1 = Yes) (0.061) (0.049)
Trade Openness 0.004
  0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Capital Account  0.039  0.087
Openness (0.002) (0.022)
Oil imports 1.613 1.556
(% GDP) (0.808) (0.707)
F Test/Wald Chi2 Test 624.14 3228.2
(global significance) (16, 23) (16)
Sargan Test (p-value) - 0.325
AR(2) (p-value) - 0.887
p  :10; p  :05; p  :01
Robust standard errors are in brackets.
a Observations: 623; No. countries: 24 and 22, respectively.
b For Fixed Effects estimations, robust standard errors are in brackets.
Arellano-Bover estimations based on twostep system-GMM, using ro-
bust standard errors corrected for finite samples (using Windmeijer’s
correction). Since Output Gap can be affected by inflation, it was
treated as endogenous. As done for lagged inflation, its lagged values
two and three periods were used as instruments in the first-difference
equations and its once lagged first differences were used as instruments
in the levels equations. In total, 21 instruments were used.
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6. Conclusion
The paper aims at investigating the implications of different designs of the monetary and financial
supervisory architecture on the inflation rate outcomes. In particular, the paper empirically examines if
monetary policy and banking regulation have conflicting goals by assessing whether institutional man-
dates in which the central bank with a banking supervisory mandate has, on average, led to higher
inflation rates than a separate regime. In addition, we consider the impact on inflation from other com-
ponents of the monetary and financial supervisory architecture, namely the degree of independence of
central banks, whether they were assigned an explicit inflation targeting mandate, or whether the es-
tablishment of deposit insurance systems with the view to enhancing financial stability by protecting
deposits may influence the monetary policy stance.
This conflicting goals argument in favour of the separation of policy mandates states that a cent-
ral bank responsible for banking regulation will be more flexible in its inflation mandate if it is con-
cerned with the impact of tight monetary conditions on bank’s profitability and soundness(Goodhart and
Schoenmaker 1993, 1995). Under these circumstances, it is likely that the flexibility in guiding monet-
ary policy will lead to higher inflation rates. We build a panel data set comprising 25 OECD countries
from 1975 to 2012 and we specify a regression model to explain the effect of a separate mandate of
banking supervision on the inflation rate. We consider additional regressors to control for other possible
determinants of inflation rates.
Our analysis differs from other studies in three ways. First, we have expanded the time span of the
sample (while maintaining the same group of countries under scrutiny); second, we adopt more appro-
priate estimation methods to deal with country specific effects and their correlation with the explanatory
variables; and third, we consider additional explanatory variables to control for the effect on inflation
rates, such as of inflation targeting practices, oil imports over GDP, and output gap, among others. We
have also performed a battery of robustness tests, which supported the main conclusion of this study.
Estimation results for both static and dynamic panel data specifications show that the separation of
banking supervision from the central bank does not have a statistically significant impact on inflation.
In this sense, the conflicting goals argument against a monetary and financial supervisory architecture
in which the central bank has a supervisory role is not supported by our empirical findings. Indeed,
these results contradict previous empirical evidence (see, as examples,DiNoia and DiGiorgio 1999 and
Copelovitch and Singer 2008). A possible explanation may lay in the argument that, even in institutional
mandates in which central banks do not have supervisory powers, they may still be concerned with the
stability of the banking system, since distress in the banking sector may disrupt the bank transmission
channels of monetary policy, impairing its effectiveness. Being this the case, central banks with a price
stability mandate may guide their monetary policy decisions also by attending to their impact on the
banking system.
Although the institutional setups of banking regulation and monetary policy do not seem to be rel-
evant in determining inflation rates, our findings indicate that there are other features of the monetary
and financial supervisory architecture that may play a role in maintaining inflation rates in low levels,
thereby contributing for the stability of the economy. On one hand, results underline the importance of
the establishment of deposit insurance schemes in determining lower levels of inflation rates. In fact, the
central bank can be more aggressive in their inflation mandate when deposits are protected, in a large
extent, by these insurance systems. Therefore, our results suggest that deposit insurance schemes can be
seen not only as an important institutional pillar in fostering financial stability, but also in contributing
to attaining the goal of price stability. Another institutional feature related to low levels of inflation is
the adoption of inflation targeting mandates. Curiously, central bank independence does not arise as
an indicator of low inflation rates, even though there is an extensive literature suggesting its important
effect on this macroeconomic variable. This result might be explained by the use of imperfect measures
of the degree of independence of central banks (Posso and Tawadros 2013).
Finally, economic factors, such as trade openness and capital account openness have also strong
effects on inflation behaviour, but the output gap stands out in terms of the magnitude of its impact on
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inflation.
Policy implications are that, given our empirical findings, the conflicting goals between monetary
policy and banking supervision should not be considered a major obstacle when designing the institu-
tional architecture of banking supervision and monetary policy in developed countries. Other concerns,
such as reputation risks and organisational costs, may pose higher challenges for central banking than
the conflict of interest effect. Recent reforms to assign an explicit financial stability mandate to mon-
etary authorities may imply new sources of conflicts with monetary policy. 30 In this new institutional
and supervisory environment in which central banks have price and financial stability mandates, the
most important challenge for central banks is to avoid that severe disruptions in the banking system or
regulatory capture by the banking industry damage its reputation as a monetary policymaker. In order
to accomplish such an outcome, Smets (2014) suggests that price stability remains as the ultimate goal
for central banks, while the objective of financial stability should lay under the primacy of stability of
prices.
Future research should be focused on understanding the economic circumstances in which these
conflicts are more likely to arise. In addition, deeper knowledge is needed on the influence of each
institutional component in promoting the stability of macroeconomic aggregates.
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